With the massive decline in savings arising from the global financial crisis (GFC) 
2
Considerable concern has arisen about the practices and strategies of superannuation funds following the destructive impact of the GFC on superannuation savings. Of particular concern has been the negative and wide variation in the performance of superannuation fund default investment options. 1 The Australian government responded to the systemic concerns by establishing a wide-ranging review of the governance, efficiency, structure and operation of Australia's superannuation system.
2 Default options were specifically targeted for review in phase two (operations and efficiency phase) of that review. In light of the criticisms of default option performance and the government's review, it is timely to consider default option practices and strategies that may have contributed to differences in the severity of performance declines following the crisis, which potentially leads to sub-optimal retirement incomes, if left unaddressed.
Although most members in accumulation superannuation funds are offered investment choice by their fund, industry research identifies that over 80% do not exercise choice and consequently, their superannuation assets are automatically invested in their fund's default option (SuperRatings 2006) .
Given this high proportion of members with superannuation invested in default options, the former
Minister for Superannuation and Corporate Law, Senator Nick Sherry, advocates the need for default options to 'provide a minimum standard that consumers can rely on' (Sherry 2008) . superannuation funds in such aspects as asset allocation, performance and in their names. Such variation across superannuation funds results from the decisions of trustees and their advisors on how assets are to be allocated and the name given to the default option. Ultimately, these decisions greatly influence the final retirement benefit paid to fund members.
Differences in default options across superannuation funds, combined with the large numbers of fund members in default options, potentially lead to inequities in the retirement outcomes of those members who remain in the default investment option of their respective funds (Gallery, Gallery and Brown 2004) . Given the prospective financial impact on vast numbers of superannuation fund members in default options, the asset allocation decision made by fund trustees is arguably one of the most important trustee decisions (Sherry 2008; Baker, Logue and Radar 2005) . generally have the ongoing option of switching to another superannuation fund and/or switching their investment option. However, the vast majority of superannuation members do not make a choice and consequently join the default fund nominated by employers, and/or the default investment option, nominated by superannuation fund trustees. Industry research shows that fund switching rates are only about 8% per year and much of this is due to employees changing jobs (Clare 2007) . Similarly, 82% of superannuation fund members are in their funds' default investment option (SuperRatings 2006) .
Prior research proposes a number of non-mutually exclusive reasons for the high proportion of people not exercising investment choice, including information overload and inertia in decision-making.
Financial illiteracy and the complexity of the superannuation system have also been suggested as factors (Fear 2008) , as well as the perception that the default option is an implicit recommendation by fund trustees (Beshears et al. 2007; Gallery et al. 2004; Choi et al. 2003) .
By not exercising choice of investment, superannuation fund members are either explicitly or implicitly deferring to their fund's trustee to decide how best their superannuation savings should be invested. The onus is therefore on trustees to ensure the default investment option is appropriate for those members who do not make an active choice. Prior research suggests that when a decision is required to be made on behalf of others, decision aversion behaviour is common (Beattie et al. 1994) . As trustees cannot avoid making decisions on behalf of fund members, they may utilise established rules and procedures in their decision-making (Clark 2008) . Evidence of the use of such heuristics and rules in decision-making has been found when individuals make decisions in situations of uncertainty (Benartzi and Thaler 2002; Simonson and Tversky 1992) . Thus, superannuation fund trustees may be inclined to utilise established default option definitions when designing such defaults for their fund.
There is very little research on the asset allocations of default options. A small study of 13 'balanced managed' default options in the UK, revealed that the average asset allocation for these balanced default options was 81% growth assets and 19% defensive assets (Byrne et al. 2007 ). In Australia, Thus, we explore whether such strategies are used by superannuation fund trustees in addressing our research question with respect to the extent to which default options vary in terms of their asset allocation, name and presentation. The documents for each superannuation fund in the sample were reviewed to identify the default investment option, its name and other details. As a wide variety of names for the default option are evident, to facilitate statistical analysis they were grouped in accordance with commonalities in their names. 'Balanced' and 'Growth' are commonly used terms in the industry, with 'growth' investment options generally understood to have higher risk and expected returns than 'balanced' options. The default options for the study sample were classified as 'balanced' if the word 'balanced' or other similar term (for example, 'moderate') was in the name; those with 'growth' in their name (including 'balanced growth') were classified as 'growth', with the remainder classified as 'other'.
Sample and Data Sources
Other relevant data collected about the default options, as disclosed in the funds' PDSs, include the asset allocation of the default option, disclosures about the level of investment risk associated with the default option, target returns, the minimum investment timeframe recommended by fund trustees, and positioning of the default option relative to other options in funds' menus of investment choices. together with results of parametric and non-parametric tests of differences between the means of each asset class for the balanced and growth-named options. Although the mean and median proportions of growth-type assets (shares and property) tend to be higher for the growth-named options than the balanced-named options, and defensive-type assets (cash and fixed-interest) tend to be lower, the results of statistical tests of differences are not consistent and inconclusive.
Results

Default Option Asset Allocation
[Insert Table 1 To further analyse whether the balanced and growth-named options can be distinguished by higher and lower risk assets, the asset classes are combined into the common groupings of lower risk 'defensive' assets (cash and fixed interest) and higher risk 'growth' assets (Australian and international shares, property and alternative assets). Table 2 Table 1 . It appears that during the stock market boom period, superannuation trustees of funds with balancednamed default investment options shifted their asset allocations towards shares, presumably to chase higher returns.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Default Option Risk Descriptions
How the sample of superannuation funds describe the level of investment risk associated with their default options is now examined. The descriptions range from low to high risk and to facilitate statistical analysis they are grouped into two categories: 'low to moderate risk', and 'high risk'. The frequencies of descriptions in each of these two categories are presented in Table 3 , which shows that default options named as balanced tend to be described as low to moderate risk, and those named as growth, tend to be described as high risk in fund disclosure documents. 7 This is consistent with the asset allocations of growth-named options generally having higher proportions of higher risk (growthtype) assets in their asset allocations than balanced-named options. Chi-square tests of association indicate that these differences in risk descriptions are statistically significant in 2005 and 2006, but not in 2007; this reflects the higher proportions of growth assets in the sample of balanced-named options in that year, and indicates that the name 'balanced' became less useful as a descriptor.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Default Option Investment Performance
If growth-named default options, on average, have more risky assets than balanced-named options, it would be expected that growth options would also have higher target returns. For the sample funds that disclosed target returns, the target returns range from 2% to 5% above CPI in 2005, 1.5% to 5% above [Insert Table 4 here] Similar to target returns, if asset allocations differ among default investment options in terms of riskiness of assets (defensive versus growth), it would be expected that their actual investment returns would also differ. Table 5 presents the mean and median short-term (current year) and long-term (4/5-year average) 8 returns reported in the PDSs and/or fund annual reports. Test results of differences between the means of investment returns of balanced and growth-named options, as reported in Table   5 , show no statistically significant differences in either the short-or long-term returns between the two groups in any of the three years. Table 5 here]
Taken together, our findings show that balanced and growth-named investment options cannot be readily distinguished on either target or actual performance.
Default Option Recommended Investment Holding Period
Recommended timeframes for holding investments vary in accordance with the nature of the investments, and are generally based on the riskiness and expected returns of the investment portfolio.
Investments with higher risk and expected returns are usually recommended to be held for longer timeperiods than less risky assets. Accordingly, it would be expected that default options named as growth would have a longer recommended holding period than balanced options. Table 6 shows that although the recommended minimum holding period for the majority of the default options is five years, the vast majority of balanced-named defaults have a recommended minimum investment period of five years or less, whereas for the growth defaults it is five years or more. Consistent with the previous results, there is also a noticeable trend towards longer recommended holding periods for balanced-named defaults over the study period.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Positioning of default option in the investments options menu
Prior research in the corporate context shows that managers utilise a variety of impression management strategies in their disclosures to investors and stakeholders ( perceptions could be adversely influenced by the framing of the options.
To gauge the extent of any variation, we examine the array of investment options presented in PDSs.
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 7 . The first two columns show the grouping of the default option as either the first option or elsewhere in the array of PDS-presented options. It is clear that the majority of funds are not simply placing the default option as first in the array of options. The next three columns show the positioning of the default according to whether it appeared in the first third (earlier), second third (middle) and last third (later) of the array. The frequencies for these groupings show considerable variation with a clear preference towards the earlier third of the array.
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The vast majority of balanced-named options appear either 'earlier' or in the 'middle', whereas the majority of growth-named options appear 'earlier'. Differences between the two groups are statistically significant in 2005 and 2006, but not in 2007 where the proportion of balanced-and growth-named options appearing 'earlier' in investment menus have converged to be the same (55%). Given the findings from behavioural research, the preference for an earlier menu placement for the balanced-and in particular, the growth-named option raises serious concerns about how the placement may be impacting on member perceptions. Further research is clearly warranted in this area.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Conclusion
Our analysis of differences between balanced-and growth-named default investment options for a sample of superannuation funds over a three-year period shows that while there were some differences The implications arising from this study highlight the need for regulators to consider how comparability of default options across superannuation funds could be improved. There is clearly a need for standardisation of naming and framing of default options in disclosure documents to ensure greater descriptive accuracy and transparency. Standardised definitions and descriptions of defaults options in relation to asset allocation, risk level, target returns, recommended investment timeframe, and placement in investment menus would facilitate comparability.
Finally, the findings of this study are subject to certain caveats. Our first caveat relates to our short study period that ends in 2007. Whether the absence of differences in the asset allocations and framing of the two categories of defaults continues in the years following the GFC is an open question and an avenue for further research. Our second caveat relates to limitations on availability of superannuation fund annual reports and product disclosure documents from public sources, and disclosures (or absence thereof) in these documents. The lack of regulatory requirements for superannuation funds to disclose certain information in their annual reports and PDSs led to missing data or inconsistencies in the data, especially in relation to the framing of the default option. While the yearly samples of funds represent between 30 and 40% of the total assets held by the relevant population of superannuation funds, industry and public sector funds are overrepresented in the sample, and corporate and retail funds are underrepresented. The sample bias arises because industry and public sector funds are more likely to allow public access to fund documents on their websites. 11 Such bias is largely unavoidable, given that there is no central repository of superannuation fund documents that fund members, researchers and other interested parties can access to make comparisons between superannuation funds. The resulting absence of full disclosure by superannuation funds is a further transparency issue that warrants consideration by policymakers and regulators. 
